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Purpose of this 
paper 
This paper considers the current status of strategic group theory in the light 
of developments over the last three decades. It then goes on to discuss the 
continuing value of the concept, both to strategic management research and 
practising managers. 
Methodology Critical review of the idea of strategic groups together with a practical 
strategic mapping illustration. 
Findings Strategic group theory still provides a useful approach for management 
research, which allows a detailed appraisal and comparison of company 
strategies within an industry. 
Research 
implications 
Strategic group research would undoubtedly benefit from more directly 
comparable, industry-specific studies, with a more careful focus on variable 
selection and the statistical methods used for validation. Future studies 
should aim to build sets of industry specific variables that describe strategic 
choice within that industry. The statistical methods used to identify strategic 
groupings need to be robust to ensure that strategic groups are not solely an 
artefact of method. 
Practical 
implications 
The paper looks specifically at an application of strategic group theory in 
the UK pharmaceutical industry. The practical benefits of strategic groups 
as a classification system and of strategic mapping as a strategy 
development and analysis tool are discussed. 
What is 
original 
The review of strategic group theory alongside alternative taxonomies and 
application of the concept to the UK pharmaceutical industry. 
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The application of strategic group theory in strategic management research stems from an 
observation by Hunt in 1972 (Hunt, 1972) that, contrary to existing theory based on the 
structure- conduct-performance paradigm in the industrial organisation (IO) literature 
(Mason, 1949, Bain, 1959), there appeared to exist performance differences between groups 
of firms within the same industry as well as across industries. Hunt coined the term “strategic 
groups” to describe  "a group of firms within the industry that are highly symmetric with 
respect to cost structure, the degree of vertical integration, and the degree of product 
differentiation, formal organization, control systems, management rewards/punishments, and 
the personal views and preferences for various possible outcomes"  (Hunt, 1972, p.8). Since 
then the most commonly used definition of strategic groups has been that provided by Porter: 
“A strategic group is the group of firms in an industry following the same or a similar 
strategy along the strategic dimensions” (Porter, 1980, p.129). Porter extended Hunt’s 
original idea to include indirect effects leading to different strategies between firms, notably 
the existence of market entry barriers. (Porter, 1976, Porter, 1979). A further definition is that 
provided by Cool, who described a strategic group as “a set of firms competing within an 
industry on the basis of similar combinations of scope and resource commitments” (Cool and 
Schendel, 1987b). The implication is that firms in a strategic group compete adopting similar 
strategies and resources, leading to intra-industry segmentation. 
 
Following this initial exploration of the phenomenon of strategic groups, research blossomed. 
The idea of groups of firms acting along similar strategic dimensions within industries 
(Porter, 1980) brought together the ideas of industrial organization, with a primary focus on 
the industry, with those of strategic management  focused on the individual firm. In terms of 
analysis, the strategic group can be viewed as a middle ground between the industry and the 
firm (Porter, 1980, Oster, 1994). Thus, the idea of strategic groups enriched the industrial 
organization perspective and provided a convenient taxonomy for strategic management 
researchers to compare and contrast groups of firms. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, as research into strategic groups expanded so a number of problems 
arose.  Broadly this was because of inconsistency in the variables selected for analysis and 







the techniques used to classify groups, as well as the differing objectives of researchers. For 
example in IO, the principle focus was on understanding the level of rivalry within the 
industry and its impact upon industry performance (Cool and Dierickx, 1993). Most studies 
encompassed a multi-industry context and employed very general, arguably almost blunt 
measures to define strategic groupings. Employing similar variables to identify strategic 
groups across industries, the common practice in IO based studies entailed trade offs and 
inconsistencies that arguably compromised accurate identification of strategic groups (Cool 
and Schendel, 1987b). Porter provided guidance on 13 possibly dimensions for defining 
strategic groups, but in his own empirical work tended to adopt a sole dimension, such as size 
or advertising (Porter, 1973, Porter, 1979). This method was pursued by subsequent 
researchers, such as Primeaux and Oster (Oster, 1982, Primeaux, 1985). The underlying 
assumption was that strategic groups invest in one or more mobility barriers that provide the 
structural impediments to allow significant and sustained performance differences to exist 
between groups of firms. 
 
In contrast to the IO studies, most strategic management research has focused on one 
industry, with the twin aims of explaining firm performance and performance differences 
between strategic groups, usually in the context of a domestic market. A point of agreement 
between the majority of strategic management and industrial organization theorists, however, 
has been that persistent performance differences exist between strategic groups. This in spite 
of the fact that most empirical studies have failed to demonstrate conclusively the clear and 
consistent linkage between strategic groups and performance predicted in the work of Hunt 
(Hunt, 1972) and Porter (Porter, 1973).  
 
In this paper we discuss the evolution of strategic group research since the 1970s and discuss 
its on-going value in strategic management research: is it a rich research vein or simply a 
worn out old seam? In spite of controversy as to whether identifiable strategic groups really 
exist (Barney and Hoskisson, 1990, Dranove et al., 1998), we conclude that strategic group 
theory still has much to offer as a focus for analysis and is superior for classification purposes 
in research to obvious alternatives such as Porter’s (1980) generic strategies and Miles and 
Snow’s (1978) typology.  We illustrate the continuing value of strategic group theory to 
management research with reference to our on-going study of strategic groups in the UK 







pharmaceutical industry. McGee (McGee, 2003) has provided an overview of strategic group 
theory and practice. Our approach builds on this review of the origins of strategic group 
research and its roots in the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm in IO, by 
focusing upon the output of strategic group research and by providing a new application. We 
accept McGee’s proposition that mobility barriers are synonymous with strategic choice 
(McGee, 2003, p.268) and contribute to his ideas on strategic mapping through the use of a 
three dimensional map to illustrate strategic groups within the UK pharmaceutical industry. 
 
 
The Evolution of Strategic Group Theory: 1970s and 1980s 
 
From the beginning two schools emerged in strategic group theory, the IO school based in 
economics and centered upon Harvard University, which included the work of Hunt, Porter, 
Oster, Caves and Porter and Newman (Hunt, 1972, Newman, 1973, Porter, 1973, Caves and 
Porter, 1977, Newman, 1978, Oster, 1982), and what is sometimes referred to as the Purdue 
School of strategic management drawing on the writings of Hatten, Patton and Cool (Hatten, 
1974, Patton, 1976, Cool, 1985).  
 
The research in IO followed a similar pattern with a multi industry focus and a reliance on 
available data on firms and various performance indices drawn primarily from available 
industry databases, for example PIMS1 or Compustat. Utilising an essentially univariate 
statistical analysis, where measures such as firm size (Porter, 1973, Porter, 1979), advertising  
(Porter, 1976, Oster, 1982) or relationships with other industries (Newman, 1973) were taken 
as proxies for strategy, an underlying belief of all the IO studies was that performance varied 
between strategic groups. This idea stemmed from Hunt and is  essentially rooted in the SCP 
paradigm within IO (Mason, 1949, Bain, 1959). Formulating competitive strategy in an 
industry is seen as “the choice of which strategic group to compete in”(Porter, 1980, p.149) 
and the principle aim is to explain performance. Entry to a market may well be a question of 
choosing the “loose brick” (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), that is to say, the strategic group that 
is easiest to enter and which best fits the resource profile of the firm.  
 
                                                 
1 PIMS is an abbreviation for the Profit Impact of Marketing Study database. 







In contrast to the approach in IO, the research undertaken at Purdue University in the 1970s 
was more rooted in what is now called strategic management theory. It was based on the idea 
that strategic groups provide a useful analytical tool to aggregate firms into those following 
similar strategies, with a view to comparing and contrasting them.  Sparked by the 
observation that profitable positions are not a function of firm size or industry concentration 
in the US brewing industry, Hatten (1974) classified the US brewing industry into seven 
strategic groups.  He went on to demonstrate that the profitability relationship between 
groups differed significantly from the profitability relationships for the industry as a whole 
and concluded that the industry was characterized by heterogeneous conduct that endured 
over time.  The policy conclusion was that industry-wide strategy recipes were to be avoided. 
This approach was extended by Patton (1976), who employed the use of simultaneous 
equations to explore the relationship between various performance variables, conduct and the 
environment. 
 
From these origins, research on strategic groups then went into a phase during the 1980s 
where various researchers looked to verify the findings of the earlier research in different 
industrial settings by employing different performance variables. For example, Hergert 
(Hergert, 1983) explored the incidence of strategic groups within fifty US manufacturing 
industries, risk was independently used as a definitive variable by Ryans and Baird (Baird 
and Kumar, 1983, Ryans and Wittinck, 1985), generic strategies by Dess and Davis (Dess 
and Davis, 1984) and the industry life cycle by Primeaux (Primeaux, 1985). The research 
results were mixed. Contemporary reviews (McGee, 1985, McGee and Thomas, 1986) 
pointed to the sensitivity of strategic group analysis to the choice of variables adopted and to 
the difficulties of comparing strategies across different industries. The conclusion was that 
detailed knowledge and understanding of an industry and its context were necessary in order 
to specify adequately the variables to be included in any useful strategic group analysis. This 
was a clear criticism of earlier IO studies with their application of general concepts and tools 
of analysis across industries. This critique was later picked up and adapted by Barney and 
Hoskisson (Barney and Hoskisson, 1990), who argued that strategic groups are an artefact of 
the methodology employed and that, in particular, the statistical technique of cluster analysis 
commonly used in studies to identify strategic groupings could be problematic. Cluster 
analysis chooses the best fit for the data between a three group or four group solution, but not 







does not clarify whether clustering the data is appropriate in the first place (Ketchen and 
Shook, 1996). 
 
These criticisms of strategic group theory as it had developed especially in the IO literature 
from 1972 to the mid-1980s led to a further phase of research. This phase focused especially 
on three themes, namely: (1) the further exploration of the concept of mobility barriers 
(Mascarenhas, 1989, Mascarenhas and Aaker, 1989); (2) the stability of strategic groups over 
time (Oster, 1982, Cool, 1985, Fiegenbaum and Primeaux, 1985, Cool and Schendel, 1987b, 
Cool and Schendel, 1987a, Fiegenbaum, 1987, Fiegenbaum et al., 1987, Martens, 1988, Cool 




Research into mobility barriers and strategic groupings in the 1980s built on the ideas of 
Caves and Porter (Caves and Porter, 1977, Caves and Pugel, 1980). McGee concluded that 
mobility barriers are a counterpart of group structures and arise from strategic decisions 
(McGee and Thomas, 1986).  Decisions which affect the height of the mobility barrier are 
critical and may be expected to arise as the result of judgments that “cannot be readily 
imitated by firms outside the group without substantial costs, substantial elapsed time or 
uncertainty about the outcome of the decisions”(McGee and Thomas, 1986, p. 150). McGee 
also proposed a taxonomy of mobility barriers, distinguishing between market-related 
strategies, industry-supply characteristics and firm characteristics. It is noteworthy that the 
mobility barriers included were endogenous to the firm and therefore were strategic decisions 
under management control. 
 
Mascarenhas and Aaker (Mascarenhas and Aaker, 1989) studying the performance 
implications of strategic groups within the oil industry considered that the concept of 
mobility barriers was pivotal to the strategic group concept and proposed a further definition 
of a strategic group, namely: “A grouping of businesses within an industry that is separated 
from other groupings of businesses by mobility barriers, barriers to entry and exit” 
(Mascarenhas and Aaker, 1989, p.475). They concluded that mobility barriers are much more 
about “who you are” and are resource dependent than “what you do” or the actions taken.  







Mobility is higher between less protected similar groups because market entry requires 
overcoming relatively fewer mobility barriers, a finding consistent with Caves and Porter 
(Caves and Porter, 1977) and the “stepping stone” idea advanced by McGee and Thomas 
(McGee and Thomas, 1986). Mascarenhas and Aaker therefore provided a research focus 
based on a common strategy conceptualisation of strategic groups. The tacit element of 
strategic decisions was brought more squarely into the argument. They concluded from their 
research that:  “The results suggest credibility for the strategic group concept motivated by 
mobility barriers ........  A high degree of group stability was observed, … indicating that 
mobility barriers did exist ...” (Mascarenhas and Aaker, 1989, p.484).  
 
Mobility barriers have continued to be a key concept that underpins the idea of strategic 
groups, providing the means by which sustained performance differences between groups can 
exist (Porter, 1980). However, mobility barriers as originally described (Caves and Porter, 
1977) included a policy of collusion in which firms acted in concert to promote their common 
interest by building high entry barriers in order to protect group profits. This idea, analogous 
to groups of residents building the walls of a medieval city to repel invaders, was not, 
however, born out by subsequent research. It seemed more probable that due to the similarity 
of strategies pursued by firms within a particular strategic group, a number of firms made 
similar investments; for example, in research and development or the deployment of large 
sales forces. This could be prompted by following the lead of an individual firm perceived as 
a reference point by other group members (Bogner, 1991, Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1995). 
The question of which variables to select in order to define strategic groups therefore 
becomes a matter of which mobility barriers best describe the structural components of an 
industry that prevent the free movement of firms between groups.  Arguably, only a handful 
of key decisions may prove to be of significance; for example, employing Porter’s generic 
“differentiation” strategy (Porter, 1980), firms might invest heavily or selectively in research 
and development where patents provide an important mobility barrier. Viewed in this way, 
the use of mobility barriers to define strategic groups becomes a process of identifying the 
key strategic decisions that build and sustain market position within a given industry. 
 
More recently Dranove et al (1998) exploring the conditions under which sustainable 
performance differences may persist, reiterate that an effective mobility barrier must be in 







place to prevent entry of imitation by outside competition, and, in addition, a group-level 
effect must occur as the result of intra-group strategic interactions (Dranove et al., 1998). 
These research findings were later confirmed in an empirical study of the Japanese steel 
industry (Nair and Filler, 2003). 
Strategic group stability 
Oster’s work on the stability of the strategic group intra-industry structures over time (Oster, 
1982) followed the methodology of Porter and defined strategic groups on the basis of high 
and low advertisers. She then explored the dynamics of strategic group membership within 19 
consumer goods industries between 1971 and 1977. Her principle findings were that strategic 
groups were stable structures with a low degree of movement between groups. Oster’s study 
deserves attention because it was the first attempt to assess empirically the extent of inter-
group mobility. However, the method adopted can be criticised for the use of an overly-
simple identification of group membership, i.e. low vs. high advertisers, and for the 
assumption that firms change group membership on an annual basis. 
 
The work of several researchers (Cool, 1985, Fiegenbaum, 1987, Martens, 1988) on strategic 
group stability shared a common methodology. First, an extensive industry analysis was 
conducted in order to identify industry specific variables. These were then operationalized to 
identify strategic groups. Second, stable strategic time periods (SSTPs) were identified 
between which changes in strategic group membership could be observed. Third, an 
extensive industry analysis was conducted in order to identify industry specific variables, 
which were then operationalized to identify strategic groups. 
 
The three studies by Cool, Fiegenbaum and Martens explored the dynamics of strategic 
groups over a considerable time period and attempted to illustrate consistent performance 
differences between groups. The work of Cool (1985) focused on the US pharmaceutical 
industry between 1963 and 1982 and that of Fiegenbaum (1987) on the US insurance industry 
over a 15 year period. Cool found only a weak relationship between his groups and the three 
performance variables he selected, suggesting that a reason for the insignificant inter-group 
variation could be the significant intra-group variation found. This threw doubt on the idea 







that group membership implies homogeneous performance and suggested that factors other 
than mobility barriers contributed to strategic success. Recently this phenomenon, predicted 
to occur in industries with low product market heterogeneity and strong resource inimitability 
(Mehra and Floyd, 1998), has become a focus of a separate line of research which suggests 
that firm positioning within a group has performance implications (McNamara et al., 2003). 
In contrast to Cool’s study, Fiegenbaum identified five to seven strategic groups within the 
US insurance industry during the period of his study, and found significant performance 
differences between the three main strategic groups that he identified for all SSTPs (with the 
exception of his risk adjusted performance measure, which was only significant for one stable 
strategic time period). An interesting element of the study was the attempt to measure firm 
movement towards industry benchmarks, where Fiegenbaum found some support for the idea 
of the strategic group as a reference point. Also, in contrast to Cool, who identified four 
SSTPs over a 20 year time span, Fiegenbaum identified nine, with the majority lasting for 
only one year.  Fiegenbaum attributed this primarily to the degree of industry turbulence 
driven by price and regulatory changes; although it is worth noting that the US 
pharmaceutical industry also faced turbulence during the 20 year period studied by Cool, so 
this explanation may not be valid. Here the idiosyncrasy of different industries stands out, 
underlining the difficulty of making valid comparisons between very different industries, 
despite the similarity in methodology and performance measures chosen by both Cool and 
Fiegenbaum. 
 
The study by Martens (Martens, 1988) built on Cool’s study and addressed the same industry, 
pharmaceuticals, although in Martens’ case across five European Community member 
countries. Unlike Cool, who employed measures of scale, scope and performance variables, 
the study by Martens employed six strategic stock variables (e.g. R&D expenditure) and a 
performance variable. A longitudinal study was adopted, measuring strategic group dynamics 
encompassing 41 pharmaceutical companies over an eight year period, between 1978 and 
1985. An interesting feature of Martens’ study is the use of a rivalry index to measure the 
competition that a firm faces within a specific market segment, in contrast to Cool (Cool, 
1985) who employed a general concentration ratio. However, in common with Cool, Martens 
failed to find a consistent performance difference between strategic groups. According to 
Martens, “although strategic stocks create the performance potential several other 







controllable and uncontrollable factors determine the performance a firm will attain” 
(Martens, 1988, p. 348). He further observed that the strategic group structure is not a very 
stable phenomenon in the EC pharmaceutical industry and that firms in groups that had a 
relatively low strategic distance experienced many strategic group shifts. But one limitation 
of Marten’s study is that performance was only measured in terms of an increase in weighted 
market share. This was shown to be dependent upon the history of the firm, environmental 
conditions, the therapeutic segment in which the firm was located, and the innovation rate. 
 
The findings of Cool and Martens for the same industry, albeit in different countries, seem to 
cast doubt upon the key idea in strategic group theory that significant performance 
differences will exist between groups. A problem arises, however, because cluster analysis, 
employed by both researchers, is sensitive to the variables chosen to define groupings. 
Although both studies were focused upon the same industry, the variables chosen to separate 
groups were different. Cool chose to include 15 variables describing scale, scope and 
resource commitments; while Martens concentrated solely upon R & D variables. Another 
possible weakness of both studies is that the variables used may be susceptible to 
multicollinearity and the inclusion of several variables that are strongly correlated will act to 
bias the results. For example, Cool uses total drug store sales, percentage drug store sales in 
total drug sales and percentage branded generic sales in total drug sales as performance 




Another approach that developed in the 1980s to define strategic groups is referred to as 
“cognitive research”. Cognitive research is based on the notion that perception is reality and 
that an understanding of decision processes can help to separate strategic groups. Cognitive 
groupings may be expected to capture both participant perceptions and indications of future 
action. The cognitive research theme encompasses the idea that managers construct market 
models based on their personal perceptions of competition, which may differ from objective 
reality. It is assumed that “through processes involving induction, problem solving and 
reasoning decision makers construct a mental model of the competitive environment”  (Porac 
et al., 1994, p. 119). These models are used both to determine who are the competition and 







where the corporate focus should be applied when competing. The outcome of realized 
strategy then rests, ultimately, upon the institutional and cognitive constructions of decision 
makers. Porac et al. introduce the idea of primary competitive groups, defined as “the 
collection of firms that define each other as rivals” (Porac et al., 1989, p. 414).  
 
This approach to strategic groups comprises a minimum of two beliefs. First, that the 
perceptions of managers about a firm’s identity, its competitors, customers and suppliers, 
determine the set of transactions that link the firm with its environment. Second, that 
perceptions determine industry recipes or generic strategies, which in turn delineate the 
actions necessary to compete in the firm’s operating environment. An important assumption 
for groupings based on common perceptions is a common interpretation of external events, 
with future resource decisions based on these interpretations. In a study of strategic group 
perceptions among Chicago bankers, Reger (Reger, 1988) found strong evidence of 
consistent cognitive maps across respondents.  While Porac et al.(Porac et al., 1994) studying 
Scottish knitwear manufacturers described the creation of cognitive communities, where 
industry “group think” results from managers in similarly placed firms interpreting the same 
environmental cues and attempting to solve similar problems. More recently in a study of 
strategic groups within the US banking industry McNamara et al questioned the belief “that 
managers within and across firms hold homogeneous beliefs regarding the competitive 
structure of their industry … and find that the degree of complexity in mental models varies 
significantly across firms” (McNamara et al., 2002, p. 167). The authors conclude that the 
manner in which top managers enact their competitive environment may contribute to 
competitive advantage. 
 
A notable advantage of the cognitive research stream in strategic group theory is the 
recognition of the importance of management perceptions in defining the competition. The 
major weaknesses of the research relate to the relatively small samples used in the empirical 
analyses and the very discrete markets chosen. In the case of the Scottish knitwear market, 
for example, Porac et al. (Porac et al., 1994) note the absence of sound, validated market data 
available to managers. This may prompt a more active exchange of views between managers 
in participating companies than would be the case in larger, more data rich industries. It is 
also important to note that drawing up strategic groups based on cognitive factors provides an 







insight into intended strategy, while studies that include performance measures (Dess and 
Davis, 1984) are comparing the outputs of realized strategy. This management perspective 
does, however, provide the opportunity to explore the mechanism behind the observed 
change of strategy and thus to add an additional dimension to strategic group research (Curto, 
1998).An enduring problem in this type of research, however, is that people do not always do 
what they say they will do - nor are they necessarily always truthful when revealing their 
intended strategy to researchers! 
 
 
Strategic Group Theory in the 1990s 
 
In the 1990s strategic management research focused on the internal resources and 
competences of firms over industrial structures to explain sustained competitive advantage. In 
the face of developments in resource-based theories of the firm, strategic group theory was 
relatively neglected. Nevertheless, some research continued and was heavily focused on 
exploring patterns of intra-industry competition. In this context the work of Bogner (Bogner, 
1991) is particularly important. 
 
Bogner looked at the US pharmaceutical market for a period of 20 years between 1969 and 
1988 and introduced the idea of the “competitive group”, which he defined as “an intra-
industry combination of firms which are following similar strategies. Where firms follow 
similar strategies because they have different historical backgrounds, that have provided them 
with different stocks or competencies or assets and because different managers have 
identified different ways in which they can compete in the industry” (Bogner, 1991, p. 496). 
Bogner studied strategic group dynamics and examined various hypotheses as to why firms 
change their grouping and under what circumstances.  
 
Using a methodology similar to previous research (Cool, 1985, Fiegenbaum, 1987, Martens, 
1988) and two distinct sets of analysis, Bogner showed that patterns certainly exist, but that 
the underlying nature of these patterns was not consistent with what had been assumed to 
underlie strategic group structures and their dynamics. Using paired questions, he first 
explored the extent to which strategic groups reflected past performance and whether 







strategic groups could be used to accurately predict future market position. He then 
considered the effect of the environment using a similar set of paired questions, one reflecting 
past responses and the other future actions. He concluded that strategic groups are not simply 
cognitive creations but are derived from artefacts of strategic intent, resource allocations and 
product introductions. Strategic groups are based upon managers’ decisions based on 
individual firm performance and objectives and not on some group homogeneity. 
 
In a second set of questions Bogner explored whether firms change groups at times of 
environmental turbulence, something predicted by mobility barrier theory because barriers 
are likely to be lowered in a state of flux. Contrary to expectation, firms were found to move 
at all times and the changes were not driven by a single environmental opportunity. Results 
that agree with those of a more recent study into evolutionary moves within the Spanish 
banking industry which concluded “that at some point in time, almost any industry should 
show some firms moving each year when the total number of firms that compose the industry 
is considered … and that individual firms will move across strategic groups in response to 
new environmental circumstances without excessive difficulties” (Zuniga-Vicente et al., 
2004). 
 
These results are consistent with a less deterministic view of strategic group theory and 
stands in stark contrast especially to the conclusions from traditional IO. In particular they 
challenge the widely held belief that strategic groups are differentially impacted by changes 
within the environment. Bogner concluded that the factors that led managers to move their 
firms out of a grouping are unrelated in time or focus to the occasional disruptions in the 
pattern of competition within the industry at large. He also concluded that a firm’s ability to 
move is not wholly constrained by environmental or mobility barriers, whether during a 
stable strategic time period or at a break between SSTPs. Mobility barriers are discussed in 
terms of the result of internal choices within firms not in terms of uncontrollable external 
events.  
 
Bogner argued that firms adjust their competitive position based on benchmarking within 
their competitive group. Economically profitable firms are ones that have the flexibility to act 
on changes in perception, manage to acquire appropriate assets, and change their competitive 







postures accordingly. If a firm is not performing to group standards, the reference position, 
then proactive choices can be made to improve competitiveness. His notion of the 
competitive group adds to the idea of strategic choice. Bogner’s study supports the 
proposition that mobility barriers are not something in the environment imposed upon the 
firm but result from the firm’s own actions. 
 
Finally, Bogner tested the proposition that performance will consistently vary between 
groups. He found no support for the proposition; a result broadly consistent with that of Cool 
and Martens (Cool, 1985, Martens, 1988) earlier. This conclusion suggests that while the 
external phenomenon observed by Hunt (Hunt, 1972) is valid, Hunt’s underlying causation of 
the dynamics of strategic groups is not supported. Bogner concluded that strategic groups 
measure similarities in the different strategies that firm’s employ, but that the way in which a 
firm chooses to compete does not ultimately determine how effectively a firm competes. Thus 
intra-group differences may outweigh inter-group differences, a conclusion also consistent 
with an observation of Cool (Cool, 1985).  
 
Another approach that blossomed briefly in the 1990s was an approach to strategic groups 
based on the pioneering work of Hannan and Freeman  (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) on the 
population ecology of organizations. This evolutionary view of strategy led to strategic 
groups considered as equivalent to species. In 1991 Boeker in a study of the US brewing 
industry applied a population ecology perspective to derive strategic groups (Boeker, 1991) 
and this was followed in 1992 by a study from Carroll and Swaminathan, also on US brewing 
(Carroll and Swaminathan, 1992). These studies argued that strategic groups should be 
identified in terms of organizational form rather than perceived strategies, which can be 
normative in nature. In this analysis, organizational form encompasses not only the formal 
organizational structure but also ‘all factors that define a population’s niche, including 
especially environmental factors’ (Carroll and Swaminathan, 1992, p.68). In other words, the 
environment, very broadly defined, determines the performance of firms. The result is a 
deterministic approach to strategic groups under which the scope for independent managerial 
decision making is severely constrained. Unsurprisingly, most researchers find such a strictly 
exogenous view of the formation and continuation of strategic groups unattractive. 
 








Appraising Strategic Group Theory Against Alternative Classification Schemes 
 
The discussion so far has highlighted the richness of strategic group theory, as well as its 
weaknesses and some inconsistencies. But a discussion of the development of strategic group 
theory alone cannot provide a conclusive comment on its value for future management 
research. To go further we need to establish the desirable characteristics of a strategy 
classification scheme for research and assess obvious alternatives to that offered by strategic 
group theory.  
 
Arguably, a strategy classification system should comprise the following characteristics to 
provide a useful basis for management research and practice: 
1. Provide a meaningful classification of strategies employed within an industry 
recognized by managers within that industry as valid. 
2. Allow competitive dynamics over time to be effectively measured and evolutionary 
pathways traced. 
3. Permit flexibility in the use of a wide range of different strategies utilizing both 
quantitative data and qualitative and “perceptual” information. 
4. Enable a fine grained analysis of strategies within an industry, allowing a detailed and 
meaningful classification based on multiple possible groupings rather than a highly 
restricted set. 
5. To be readily accessible to and useable by managers. 
 
Two obvious alternative strategy classifications to strategic groups for research in strategic 
management are Porter’s “generic strategies” and the Miles and Snow’s “typologies”. We 
now discuss each in turn and with reference to the UK pharmaceuticals industry, which is the 
subject of the mapping later in the paper and our on-going research, and compare their merits 
to strategic group theory. The aim is to establish whether strategic group theory offers a 
superior strategy classification based on the five characteristics above. 
 
Porter’s approach to generic strategies plots companies along two simple dimensions, the 
breadth of their product/market offering against the choice of selling on price as “lowest cost 







producer” or differentiating on product benefits or other added value. Porter thus offers four 
broad positioning alternatives, broad market vs. focus and low cost vs. differentiation. The 
advantage of the generic strategies approach lies in its simplicity and comparative ease of 
application. All of the data necessary to populate the model are readily available. The 
principle weakness of generic strategies is that it represents a blunt and crude measure to 
identify and portray subtle patterns of strategic choice. It does not allow the sophisticated 
separation of different but broadly similar strategic choices. 
 
In the pharmaceutical industry, for example, a primary driver is the supply of new products. 
But Porter’s classification does not allow for the separation of companies employing an 
extensive licensing strategy, for example as pursued by the company Wyeth, as against a 
strategy based primarily upon researching own compounds, as adopted, for instance, by 
Merck. It must also be recognized that research costs are a significant mobility barrier in the 
industry. Pharmaceutical companies are forced by the economics of the research process to 
employ a differentiated marketing approach targeted at the broadest market possible to 
recoup their research costs before patent expiry. Therefore, while the product/market 
dimension has some value within this industry, the differentiated vs. low cost dimension is 
too blunt to provide significant explanatory power. Porter’s generic strategies may, however, 
be perceived as supra groupings into which different sets of strategic groups may fit; a 
conclusion hinted at by Porter: “The three generic strategies represent three broad and 
consistent approaches to successful strategic positioning …. They are different broad types of 
strategic groups that can be successful depending on the economics of the particular 
industry”(Porter, 1980, p 152). In other words, strategic group theory provides the potentially 
fine grained analysis in which the concept of generic strategic can be nested. 
 
The Miles and Snow typology (Miles and Snow, 1978) differentiates firms into four 
groupings - defender, prospector, analyzer and reactor. Again two key dimensions are used to 
separate firms, namely breadth of product/market domain, a dimension also chosen by Porter, 
and the degree of environmental uncertainty. The nub of Miles and Snow’s argument hinges 
on three points. First, that managerial or strategic choice represents the primary link between 
an organization and its environment. Second, that management’s ability to understand and 
manage the organization’s interaction with its environment is the key to success. Third, that a 







primary distinguishing factor between organization types is the multiple ways that 
management responds to environmental cues. In essence, the Miles and Snow typology 
broadly classifies firms into three discernable strategic types and reactors, which arguably 
represents a catch all category representing no clear strategy and equivalent to Porter’s “stuck 
in the middle”. The primary variables used to classify firms and position them along the two 
dimensions are product/market domain, growth engine, technology, planning, structure, 
control, performance appraisal and co-ordination. Clearly, the last five of these variables are 
all “internal” to the firm and effectively invisible to the external observer and therefore to 
apply Miles and Snow’s typology in research requires the gathering of perceptual 
information. This brings with it the attendant problems of distinguishing between realized 
and intended strategy and the mapping of evolutionary changes is also rendered problematic. 
Thus, while Miles and Snow’s classification allows the consideration of a number of 
variables, the taxonomy presents a number of problems with regard to data gathering, ease of 
application and interpretation. 
 
In contrast, the strategic group taxonomy, we believe, offers a more flexible, transparent and 
meaningful method to classify, compare and contrast firms by their strategies than that 
offered by ‘generic strategies’ or by Miles and Snow. It permits both sophisticated 
mathematical analysis of relationships and simpler analysis using strategic mapping. Strategic 
group analysis can encompass both quantitative and qualitative variables. Table 1 provides a 
comparison of the different typologies according to the earlier five characteristics of a useful 
strategy classification scheme, namely meaningfulness to managers, ability to map the 
evolution of the dynamics of the industry, data flexibility, sensitivity to multiple groupings 
and accessibility to managers. While all three approaches – generic strategies, Miles and 
Snow and strategic groups – can be meaningful to managers, strategic group theory offers 
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The earlier review of strategic group theory since the 1970s identified the different ways in 
which the concept of the strategic group had developed as a tool for determining competitive 
performance, at least in part due to differences in the way in which the concept had been 
operationalized. Simplistic cause-effect relationships derived from the IO literature, and 
especially on the role of mobility barriers, had given way by the 1990s to the study of more 
complex relationships, in which strategic decision making both shapes and is shaped by 
strategic groupings and in which managerial cognition is important. The result was a richer 
theory of strategic groups; but since the early 1990s the emphasis in strategic management 
research has laid more in resource-base theories of the firm, including the study of core 
competencies, than strategic groups per se. Nevertheless, our conclusion is that the concept 
still has considerable potential in strategic management research provided it is used with care. 
We now illustrate its value through a strategic mapping of the UK pharmaceutical industry.  




An Application of Strategic Group Theory: the UK Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
Strategic group maps allow managers and researchers to develop a classification of strategy 
conducted in their industry. Also, through comparing maps at different time periods, the 
competitive dynamics and evolution of an industry may be better understood. Moreover, the 
patterns of strategic behaviour present within the industry can be identified and may be of 
value in predicting future company moves. Finally, identification of “reference companies” 
(Bogner, 1991, Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1995, McNamara et al., 2003) within strategic 
groups simplifies competitor analysis, as group members may generally be expected to invest 
in similar ways to and follow the strategies of  the lead company within the group. Our 
strategic mapping exercise below is based on detailed research into the UK pharmaceuticals 
industry drawing upon company reports, web sites, published industry appraisals, interviews 
and the direct experience of one of the authors, who was until recently a senior manager in 
UK pharmaceuticals. The mapping emphasises the importance of intra as inter-group 
dynamics and particularly the role of mobility barriers, strategic group stability, and 
management cognition and management decisions based on individual performance and 







objectives. In other words, the mapping is a product of the developments in strategic group 
research reviewed above and provides a synthesis of the different approaches to strategic 
group theory. It uses two key strategic drivers in pharmaceuticals as axes.  In constructing a 
strategic group map, Porter (1980, p.152) has suggested that “the best strategic variables to 
use as axes are those that determine the key mobility barriers”.  
 
The importance of research and development within the pharmaceutical industry has been 
cited by many authorities (Redwood, 1988, Corstjens, 1991, Taggart, 1993, Agrawal, 1999). 
The cost of research activity generally constitutes equivalent to 15% to 20% of total revenues 
in the industry and is a major mobility barrier both into the industry and within the industry 
between different markets and different market segments. The cost is correlated with the 
number of therapeutic areas or “body systems”, for example respiratory or gastrointestinal, 
which are actively researched and maintained to “world class” standards. One obvious axis 
for a strategic group mapping of the UK pharmaceuticals industry is therefore “active 
therapeutic areas”. 
 
With the cost of research and development of each new chemical entity in the order of  
$800m (Hawthorne, 2003) and patent expiry a critical competitive watershed, the importance 
of building a market presence rapidly has increased the role of an effective sales force to  
build prescription share and differentiate products from the available alternatives. Sales force 
“detailing” costs, for many companies are the greatest operating expense, with the cost of 
sales and marketing frequently in the order of 30% of total revenues. The term detailing is 
one used in the pharmaceutical industry to describe calls on doctors to explain the features 
and benefits of a product. A second obvious axis for a strategic group mapping of the UK 
pharmaceutical industry is therefore the number of details or sales calls, where sales-force 
size acts as an effective mobility barrier in three main ways. First, the investment required 
limits field force size for many companies. Second, fielding a large sales force acts to 
differentiate a product from the competition and provides a barrier that competitors must 
overcome. Third, mopping up available doctor appointments effectively excludes the 
competition from the opportunity to compete. In effect, all pharmaceutical companies 
compete for available time with the doctor, which is a finite resource. 
 







The use of a bubble chart offers the opportunity to introduce a third variable to separate 
companies - “leadership”. Leadership, as measured by a dominant sales position within a 
given therapeutic area, acts in our mapping as a proxy for two important strategic dimensions, 
namely technological leadership and relative price. Technological leadership within the 
pharmaceutical industry is generally associated with being first to market, where the initial 
entrant has the opportunity to establish a dominant market share. The company’s price 
position tends also to be strongly associated with market entry because the UK profit and 
price regulation scheme (PPRS) under National Health Service (NHS) regulations only 
allows the company to agree a price at point of entry. Subsequently, no price rises for the 
same product are allowed. This results in UK pharmaceutical companies generally adopting 
one of two pricing strategies, which are illustrated in Table 2. The first entrant sets the ceiling 
price for that type of product, which is then either adopted by the next entrant (i.e. a strategy 
of price parity) or the new entrant may attempt to gain share through offering similar benefits 
at a discount (i.e. a price discount strategy).  For example, in the table Losec was the first 
anti-ulcer drug, introduced in 1989, and later competing products were priced at a discount. 
In contrast, for anti-depressants Seroxat was priced at parity with the first product, Prozac, 
introduced two years earlier, although the later entrants price discounted. For cholestoral 
lowering drugs there are examples of both parity and discounting pricing strategies.  
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A strategic map for the current UK pharmaceutical industry, drawing on the above discussion 
of axes and variables is provided in Figure 1, where twelve strategic groups are identified. In 
the mapping exercise the greater the size of the circles, the larger the number of areas in which 
a company has therapeutic leadership. Overlapping circles indicate that the companies within a 
strategic group have similar configurations of detailing activity and therapeutic areas served. 
Table 3 provides details on the number of therapy areas, the sales force activity incurred 
presented as thousands of details, and leadership as used in the mapping exercise. It also 
provides a summary of which companies fall in which of the strategic groups in the mapping. 
The positions are discussed in more detail below. The data used in the analysis were drawn 







from the combined British Pharmaceutical Industry and Hospital Audits together with data 
from the UK Promotional Audit and were based on the databases of IMS Health. IMS Health is 
the leading provider of market information to the UK Pharmaceutical Industry.  
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Group A consists of the companies Lundbeck and Servier. These companies are both of 
European origin and both focus their attention upon one area of therapeutic medicine. 
Both companies spend a substantial amount on sales force but are not overall 
therapeutic leaders. Use of Porter’s generic strategies (Porter, 1980) would classify 
these companies as pursuing a focused differentiated strategy. 
 
Group B is interesting in that it includes all of the Japanese companies within the 
industry, i.e. Sankyo, Takeda, Yamanouchi, Eisai, Ajinomoto, and Fujisawa, together 
with two recent European entrants, Menarini and Orion. Of these it is worthy of note 
that Sankyo and Yamanouchi entered the UK market via acquisition acquiring Pan 
Pharma and Brocades respectively, in contrast to the other recent entrants all of whom 
have established their position organically. The only surprise in this group is Reckitt 
Benckiser an industrial company that is the world number 1 in household cleaning but 
has a small pharmaceutical division. This group appears to encompass virtually all the 
industry new entrants in recent years, who appear to have adopted a similar focused 
entry strategy based upon no more than two therapeutic areas and supported by a 
moderate-sized sales force.  
 
Group C comprises Mundi Pharma and Elan, both US drug delivery companies, 
together with UCB Pharma, a niche speciality pharmaceutical company engaged in 
research and development in the fields of allergic/respiratory diseases and disorders of 
the central nervous system. All three companies are pursuing a focused differentiation 
strategy based upon a limited number of therapy areas. 
 
Group D includes Ferring and Schering AG both niche pharmaceutical companies 







together with 3M, Procter and Gamble and Solvay.  These are all large diversified 
industrial companies with limited pharmaceutical operations. All are focused upon four 
therapeutic areas and employ relatively small sales forces. The exception is Ferring, 
which does not employ a conventional detailing force. 
 
Group E encompasses Leo laboratories, a Danish company specialising in 
pharmaceuticals and animal health, Merck KGAA, which is a German pharmaceutical 
company with a strong interest in generics, Ivax, a US branded generic manufacturer, 
and Baxter, a US company specialising in hospital products. This group is somewhat of 
a hybrid hence the dotted line on the mapping and includes a number of companies that 
appear diverse, with both Merck KGAA and Ivax marketing generic products. 
 
Group F includes Bayer and Lilly both companies that have recently experienced strong 
market changes, Bayer with the withdrawal of its main product Lipobay and Lilly that 
lost 90% of its revenues from Prozac following patent expiry. The third company, Shire 
Pharmaceuticals, recently underwent dramatic changes following the removal of its 
chief executive. There is evidence from our research that all three companies have 
reduced their promotional expenditure whilst considering their options. 
 
Group G comprises Boehringer Ingelheim, Bristol Myers Squibb and Johnson and 
Johnson. All field good sized sales forces and support a broad and not wholly congruent 
range of products both to the retail and hospital markets. All three companies derive 
between 20% and 30% of revenue from sales to hospitals. 
 
Group H consists solely of Roche, a company engaged in a number of healthcare related 
businesses and that grew both organically and as a result of merger. Roche derives 40% 
of its revenues from the hospital market and fields a number of specialised sales teams 
rather than the large, mainly GP oriented, field forces typical of rival companies of a 
similar size. Roche employs a differentiated strategy aimed at a broad section of the 
market. 
 
Group I occupies the middle ground within the UK pharmaceutical industry. The 







companies within this strategic group include Abbott, Astra Zeneca, Sanofi Synthelabo, 
Schering Plough and Wyeth. All of these companies derive more than 85% of their 
revenues from the retail pharmaceutical market. All, and particularly Astra Zeneca, 
Wyeth and Schering Plough, are known for strongly targeted, aggressively driven sales 
forces, which concentrate upon general practitioners. All with the exception of Schering 
Plough have grown in part through merger or acquisition and all are pure 
pharmaceutical companies. Sanofi Synthelabo and Novartis are the only members of 
this group with an interest in generic medicines. These companies sell through high 
contact coverage of their targeted customer group and operate a broadly differentiated 
strategy. 
 
Group J includes Merck Sharp and Dohme together with Pfizer. These two companies 
have a lot in common. They are both US based pharmaceutical companies renowned for 
large and high coverage contact sales forces, high spending on research and 
development, and they derive more than 90% of their revenues from the retail market. 
Support for this positioning appears in a recent book on Merck, which cites the 
company’s executives as saying that Pfizer is their number one competitor (Hawthorne, 
2003). 
 
Group K companies span a broad range of therapeutic areas and derive up to 30% of 
their revenues from sales to hospitals. All of these companies are the result of serial 
mergers and all face the problem of sustaining their present size given declining 
industry research and development productivity.  Given the number of therapeutic areas 
that they are involved in, they all have large numbers of differently focused sales teams 
to support and invest heavily in both product promotion and research. Their strategy, 
therefore, is very much broad market and differentiated. 
 
Group L companies appears to be stuck in the middle. Goldshield is a branded generic 
manufacturer and relies largely on telesales to sell its products to retail chemists and 
hospital pharmacies rather than via doctors. The company faces strong competition 
from generic manufacturers with a lower cost base. Celltech is a biotechnology 
company that has been around a long time but which has yet to produce a significant 







product. The company has grown through acquisition and derives the bulk of its sales 
from products acquired from Medeva, one of its acquisitions. It is not apparent that 
either of these companies has a clear positioning and the share prices of both companies 
have suffered recently. To denote this somewhat hybrid group it is surrounded by a 
rectangular dotted line. 
 
This example of a strategic mapping based on the UK pharmaceutical industry illustrates a 
number of the potential benefits from undertaking a strategic group analysis. Application of 
the method enables an overview of the industry to be presented, differentiating between firms 
and groupings, and provides evidence of a good deal of congruence within the strategic 
groups identified; for example, the inclusion of Merck and Pfizer together, the grouping 
together of all of the Japanese entrants, and the inclusion within group K of companies that 
have participated in serial mergers. The results strongly support the argument that strategic 
group analysis can provide a useful taxonomy of industry strategies. At the same time, the 
analysis raises interesting research questions; for example, why have no Japanese companies 
adopted a more aggressive sales stance given the size of their parent companies; have their 
parents forced them to grow organically? Such questions can form the basis for a successful 
competitor analysis to improve strategy formulation and implementation. Our analysis 
suggests, therefore, that the strategic group mapping provides a useful basis for research on 





Strategic group theory developed from the early 1970s based on analysing structural 
impediments that protect industry positions and profits from erosion by preventing free 
movement of firms within an industry. The emphasis in strategic management research in the 
1990s on resources and competences, along with the growing diversity in approaches to 
defining strategic groups in strategic group theory in the 1980s, led to some neglect of the 
subject in more recent times. There has been ‘Much uncertainty about the importance, or 
even the existence, of strategic groups’ (Warren, 2002, p. 196). 
 







The argument in this paper is that strategic group theory still provides a useful approach for 
management research.  This has been illustrated by comparison with two obvious alternatives 
in strategic management research – Porter’s generic strategies and Miles and Snow’s 
classification of strategic positioning – and through the development of a strategic mapping 
of the current UK pharmaceutical industry. The paper has detailed the main developments in 
strategic group theory and has contrasted the various approaches adopted. The result today is 
a rich research vein rather than a worn out seam.  Strategic group theory provides a means for 
managers and researchers to aggregate firms into groups employing similar strategies to 
permit a better understanding of the competitive dynamics of an industry and its evolution. In 
terms of future research, strategic group theory would undoubtedly benefit from more 
directly comparable, industry-specific studies, with a more careful focus on variable selection 
and the statistical methods used for validation. As we have noted, some earlier research 
appears to have deficiencies both in terms of the variables used and in an over-simplistic use 
of cluster analysis. Future studies should aim to build sets of industry specific variables that 
describe strategic choice within that industry and the statistical methods used to identify 
strategic groupings need to be robust to ensure that strategic groups are not solely an artefact 
of method. This is the focus of our continuing research into strategic group theory and its 
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Pricing Strategy in the UK Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
MARKET PRODUCT COMPANY INTRODUCED PRICE Relative Price 
      
Anti-ulcer 
drugs Losec Astra 1989 28.56 1.00 
 Zoton Wyeth 1994 23.75 0.83 
 Protium Abbott 1996 23.65 0.83 
 Pariet Eisai 1998 22.75 0.80 
      
Cholesterol 
lowering  
drugs Zocor MSD 1989 29.69 1.00 
 Lescol Novartis 1994 12.72 0.43 
 Lipostat BMS 1996 29.69 1.00 
 Lipitor Pfizer 1997 29.69 1.00 
 Lipobay Bayer 1997 17.35 0.58 
      
Anti-
depressants Prozac Lilly 1989 16.58 1.00 
 Seroxat GSK 1991 16.58 1.00 
 Efexor Wyeth 1995 11.99 0.72 
 Lustral Pfizer 1996 16.2 0.98 
      
 
 
Note: prices lower than 1.0 indicate use of a price discount strategy.
  Table 3: 
 

























SERVIER 1.00 109.3 0 A 
LUNDBECK 1.00 124.6 0 A 
SANKYO 1.00 28.6 0 B 
AJINOMOTO 2.00 0.6 0 B 
FUJISAWA 2.00 1.7 0 B 
RECKITT 2.00 19.5 0 B 
ORION 2.00 26.5 0 B 
EISAI 2.00 28.8 0 B 
MENARINI 2.00 38.4 0 B 
YAMANOUCHI 2.00 65.3 0 B 
TAKEDA 2.00 79.6 0 B 
ELAN 3.00 14.5 0 C 
UCB PHARMA 3.00 51.5 0 C 
MUNDI PHARMA 3.00 72.4 0 C 
FERRING 4.00 0.0 0 D 
3M 4.00 21.6 0 D 
PROCTER  4.00 31.1 0 D 
NOVO NORDISK 4.00 31.7 0 D 
SCHERING AG 4.00 48.9 0 D 
SOLVAY 4.00 66.0 0 D 
BAXTER 5.00 0.0 0 E 
IVAX 5.00 27.8 0 E 
AKZO NOBEL 5.00 51.5 0 E 
LEO 5.00 61.8 1.00 E 
MERCK KGAA 6.00 25.6 0 E 
BAYER 7.00 9.9 0 F 
SHIRE 7.00 32.6 0 F 
LILLY 7.00 67.2 0 F 
BOEHRINGER ING 8.00 83.0 0 G 
BMS 9.00 51.1 0 G 
JOHNSON & J 9.00 51.3 0 G 
ROCHE 13.00 68.7 1.00 H 
ASTRA ZENECA 7.00 233.2 1.00 I 
SCHERING PL 9.00 137.0 0 I 
SANOFI SYNTH 9.00 171.8 1.00 I 
ABBOTT 9.00 176.9 0. I 
NOVATIS 9.00 199.4 0 I 
WYETH 10.00 204.4 1.00 I 
MSD 10.00 365.4 1.00 J 
PFIZER 12.00 390.7 1.00 J 
PHARMACIA 13.00 208.2 4.00 K 
GSK 13.00 282.2 2.00 K 
AVENTIS 14.00 148.0 0 K 
GOLDSHIELD 9.00 0.2 0 L 
CELLTECH 9.00 12.6 0 L 
 
Leadership figures refer to the number of leadership positions in different therapy areas that the 
company holds. A value of 0 denotes no leadership in any therapy area. 
 
 













All these analyses were conducted using the standard quantitative databases of IMS Health the 
leading provider of market information to the UK Pharmaceutical Industry. The strategic group 
map displayed encompasses data from the combined British Pharmaceutical Index and Hospital 















































Size of Circle indicates number of areas
where therapeutic leadership held. The 
smaller circles represent companies that 
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